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The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent:
Settlement Conflicts between Defendants
and Liability Insurers
Michael J. Meurer
Duke University and AT&T Bell Laboratories

1. Introduction
A pervasive problem in the settlement of liability litigation arises because
liability insurers bundle their promise to indemnify the insured with a promise
to represent the insured in settlement and litigation [see, e.g., Beckwith Machinery Co. v. TravelersIndemnity Co., 638 F.Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1986)].
Standard policies not only require the insurer to pay for legal representation
but, more importantly, give the insurer the privilege of controlling the litigation and settlement process. The problem is how to resolve the conflict of
interest between the insurer and the insured that may arise during settlement
negotiations. This conflict is manifest when the insurer rejects a settlement
1
offer within the policy limits and elects to pursue trial. Inevitably, the insured
defendant is displeased ex post following a damage judgment in excess of the
insurance coverage. In this article, I evaluate the impact of this conflict under
two different legal regimes.
Mayers and Smith (1981) contend that legal services are bundled with
I gratefully acknowledge the Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Yale
Law School for support during my tenure as an Olin Faculty Research Fellow. Thanks to Bob
Marshall, Scott Masten, Roberta Romano, Harry Shuford, Kent Syverud, and an anonymous
referee for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are not necessarily shared by AT&T.
1. Another type of conflict may arise in cases in which the insurer wants to settle and the
defendant wants to litigate. This problem is common when the defendant is a professional who is
concerned about his or her reputation in a malpractice suit. The conflict may also arise if the
insured can be forced to contribute a deductible, coinsurance, or excess to a settlement agreement. See Syverud for a discussion of the law and economics of insurance and liability litigation.
© 1992 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. ISSN 8756-6222
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liability insurance to protect the insurer. They argue that a defendant would
select too low a quality and quantity of legal services to handle a claim if the
defendant were confident of a settlement or judgment within the policy limits. 2 While this insight is important, it does not resolve the question of why
these services are bundled. What Mayers and Smith have done is describe the
impact of the conflict between the insurer and the insured in the case in which
the insured controls settlement and trial. It is still necessary to make a judgment about the relative efficiency of contracts that give this authority to the
insurer as opposed to the insured.
The essence of the conflict between the insurer and the insured inheres in
the limits on indemnity provided by typical liability policies. If a potential
defendant were fully insured against any possible damage judgment, then the
insured would have no stake in the insurer's handling of a claim. Thus a
preliminary issue arises as to why coverage is limited. One explanation is that
the presence of moral hazard mandates incomplete coverage (Pauly). A road
not taken in this article is an investigation of the trade-off between control of
moral hazard and alleviation of the settlement conflict. Instead, I argue that
even in the absence of a moral hazard problem, limited coverage emerges as
an optimal choice for risk-averse potential defendants in a competitive insurance market. The parties in fact choose to create the conflict, because it makes
the insurer a more effective bargainer.
A compelling example of the conflict of interest is provided by the case of
Crisci v. Security Insur. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal.2d 425 (1969). The case
arose when a tenant broke through a staircase and was left dangling 15 feet
above the ground. The experience apparently induced a psychosis in the
woman. She sued her landlord Crisci claiming that Crisci had been negligent
in the inspection and maintenance of the staircase. In this first case, the
defendant's (Crisci's) liability insurance from Security had a limit of $10,000,
and the plaintiff (the tenant) demanded $9,000 in settlement. Security refused
to settle. Subsequently, the jury awarded the plaintiff $101,000. As a result,
Crisci was rendered indigent and suicidal and consequently filed suit against
Security. The court took the occasion to impose an obligation on insurers to
negotiate settlement in good faith for the benefit of the insured as well as the
insurance company.
Within a few years of Crisci most other states also imposed a duty on the
insurer to consider the insured's interest in settlement and trial. These decisions displaced a legal regime that respected the terms of the insurance contract when it gave complete discretion to the insurer. I use the phrase laissezfaire rule to label this regime. Under the new regime, which I call the modern
rule, the courts have devised a negligence standard 3 to measure the insurer's
duty and frequently express the standard in terms of an obligation of the
insurer to give the insured's interest equal consideration. Often this standard is
2. This problem apparently is surmountable, since directors' and officers' liability insurance
allows the insured to run their own defense.
3. According to Dobbyn, the bad-faith standard favored by many jurisdictions is essentially
equivalent to the negligence standard.
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implemented by calling on the insurance company to act as if the coverage
under the policy were unlimited.
To translate the modem rule into a policy that can be analyzed easily in a
bargaining model, I suppose that it forces the insurer to bargain as if it were
minimizing the sum of payments made by the defendant and itself in settlement or trial. In other words, the effect of the modem rule is to make the
attorney a faithful agent of the joint interests of the parties. In contrast, in the
laissez-faire regime the attorney arrives at the bargaining table thinking only
of the insurer's interests.
When analyzing the two rules, Abraham argues that the modem rule is
efficient because it forces the insurer to internalize the risks to the insured's
assets posed by rejecting settlement. He contends that with the laissez-faire
rule there is a "danger that an insurer, faced with a settlement offer at or near
the policy limits, will reject it and gamble with the insured's money to further
its own interests" (p. 192).
In this article I come to the same conclusion as Abraham but for different
reasons. The conflict between the insurer and the insured over settlement
policy that arises under the laissez-faire rule cannot be properly described as
an externality when the two parties have agreed to the contract that creates the
conflict. Furthermore, the conflict is evident in commercial general-liability
policies where the insured is apt to be a sophisticated buyer not subject to the
exercise of market power by the seller.
In fact, the parties find limited coverage and the delegation of bargaining
authority to the insurer to be a valuable device for improving the bargaining
4
position of the insurer against potential plaintiffs. If the liability insurance
market is competitive, then the insured benefits in the form of a lower premium. The insured may be unhappy ex post with the actions of its unfaithful
agent, but ex ante it freely chooses such an agent. Even though the parties to
the insurance contract want to give the insurer full discretion, the modem rule,
which defeats their preference, is socially desirable. The reason is that the
tactics that give a larger share of the settlement pie to the insurer and defendant also shrink the size of the pie. Inefficiency, exhibited as trial expenditures
and inappropriate risk bearing, is the problem.
2. The Basic Model
A potential tort liability defendant-for example, a homeowner or consumer
product manufacturer-faces an exogenous probability of accident given by
a. If the accident occurs, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover at trial a
random variable D with a distribution function F on [0,oo). Litigation expenditures are exogenously fixed at L for each side (rules of legal cost allocation are
discussed in Section 4), but out-of-court settlement is costless. Parties are
symmetrically informed about the probability of accident and the distribution
4. See Katz for a general discussion of the benefits to a principal of hiring an agent to
negotiate for the principal.
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of damages; thus, equilibrium litigation cannot emerge from private informa5
tion or optimism.
The potential plaintiff and defendant are unable to contract before the
accident since their identifies are unknown to each other, but the potential
defendant is able to enter an insurance contract with a firm in a competitive
insurance industry. The insurer is constrained to offer actuarially fair insurance for a premium of P. The insurance has a coverage limit of C, meaning
that the insurer agrees to reimburse the insured for settlement payments or
damage awards up to the amount C. Any excess is paid by the defendant, who
never faces a solvency constraint. 6 In addition to the coverage C, the insurer
agrees to pay litigation costs L if trial occurs. Furthermore, the insurer holds
the right to manage settlement negotiations and litigation with the plaintiff.
The significance of this right will be elaborated below.
The settlement game simply consists of the potential defendant choosing
coverage C in stage 1 and the insurer and plaintiff engaging in a cooperative
bargaining process in stage 2 if an accident occurs. All three parties are
assumed to be risk-neutral wealth maximizers. (In Section 5, I make the
defendant risk averse, so risk-sharing issues can be analyzed.) In addition, I
assume that all three parties have symmetric information about the distribution
of damages at trial.
The cooperative bargaining solution invoked to handle settlement negotiations between the insurer i and the plaintiff p selects the point on the settlement frontier that provides an equal split of the gains from settlement. Specifically, T = (t,,t,) is the threat point or secure profit to the insurer and plaintiff
from trial, 7 = (;ir,;rp) is a feasible bargaining outcome, and the bargaining
frontier is sr, = g(.ri). The specification of this frontier is determined by the
insurance contract and the relevant rules of insurance law and will be given
below for various cases. Let the total settlement payment received by the
plaintiff be X. An equal-split bargain requires that X = tP + [gains from
settlement], where the gains will be defined below.
The bargaining outcome depends on which legal rule applies. Under the
laissez-faire rule the insurer is free to disregard the consequence of settlement
or litigation for the insured defendant. I give effect to this regime by (i)
making the insurer's threat point equivalent to the insurer's expected liability
from trial and (ii) computing the settlement gains by comparing the sum of the
payoffs from settlement and trial of the insurer and the plaintiff.In contrast,
since the modem rule requires the insurer to maximize the joint payoff of the
insurer and the defendant, I assume (i) that the insurer's threat point is the sum
of the trial payoffs to the insurer and the defendant, and (ii) that the gains of all
three partiesfrom settlement compared to trial are split so that half of the gain
goes to the plaintiff.
The cooperative bargaining outcomes under each of the rules are charac5. For a review of models of litigation, see Cooter and Rubinfeld.
6. The impact of a solvency constraint is described in note 10.
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terized in Section 3. Before moving to that task, I present a numerical example to illustrate the role of policy limits in a settlement negotiation.
Assume that if a particular case goes to trial the damage award will be $1
million with probability .5 and $3 million with probability .5. Further assume
that coverage is $2 million and trial costs to each side are $0.4 million. The
plaintiff's expected gain at trial is (.5)3 + (.5)1 - .4 = 1.6. Under the laissezfaire rule, the insurer's expected loss at trial is (.5)2 + (.5)1 + .4 = 1.9.
Notice that the insurer pays only $2 million (the policy limit) in the event of a
$3 million judgment. If the parties settle at half the difference, then the
plaintiff receives a payment of $1.75 million from the insurer. In contrast, the
modem rule requires the insurer to consider the effect of trial and settlement
on the insured. The expected loss from trial for the insurer and the insured is
(.5)3 + (.5)1 + .4 = 2.4. The settlement would now be at $2 million. The
message is that the modem rule makes the insurer a less effective bargainer.
However, there is a price to be paid for the bargaining effectiveness of the
laissez-faire rule. The insurer may disregard the insured's interest and go to
trial rather than settle. If trial costs are reduced to $0.2 million, then the
plaintiff's minimum settlement demand is $1.8 million, while the insurer's
maximum offer is $1.7 million. Thus, the case is not settled. Of course, under
the modem rule, settlement at $2 million still occurs.
In the following section I develop the results of this numerical example. I
show that under the laissez-faire rule the insurer is a more effective bargainer
because the policy limit protects the insurer to some extent from the consequences of an unfavorable damage award. But limited coverage also produces
the possibility of equilibrium litigation.
3. Settlement Negotiation
The settlement outcome under the modem rule is trivial to calculate. The
plaintiff's expected profit from trial is f - L, where f is the expected value of
D, and the insurer must act as if its expected profit from trial is -/6 - L.
Thus, the gains from settlement are 2L. The parties always settle, with the
plaintiff receiving D, which is the sum of the expected trial profit and one-half
of the gains from settlement. The defendant pays max{0,D) - C} and the
insurer pays min{C,5}. This outcome is a useful benchmark for comparison to
the laissez-faire regime. The profit earned by the plaintiff is the same as what
would be earned if the plaintiff and uninsured defendant negotiated directly;
hence, under the modem rule the defendant gains no advantage from purchas-7
ing insurance and giving control of the settlement negotiations to the insurer.
Analysis of the bargaining outcome under the laissez-faire policy shows
that the defendant may be able to reduce the settlement payment to the
plaintiff below b by delegating control of the settlement negotiations. As
above, the threat point for the plaintiff is tp = D - L, but the threat point for
7. The behavior of the insurer when it is forced to act as if there were no policy limit is not
equivalent to the behavior of an uninsured defendant if the defendant's risk aversion impairs
bargaining power.
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Figure 1. Regions of strong settlement, weak settlement, and litigation.
the insurer is now tj= -b - L + H(C), where HC = f (D - C)dF(D) is
the expected excess of the damage award above the policy limit-in other
words, the expected cost of trial to the defendant. The bargaining set is
illustrated in Figure 1. The axes measure rP and.ax1, the payoffs to the plaintiff
and insurer. The settlement frontier is the kinked solid line labeled.arj, = g(ax 1),
and the bargaining set includes the frontier and the points below and to the
left. For values of .7r,> - C, the frontier is the line segment wit a slope of-i1
starting at the origin. At ax1 = -C, the frontier becomes vertical because the
insurance company is never liable for more than C of a settlement payment. 8
Three different types of outcomes may result from the bargaining process
under the laissez-faire regime: the parties may choose litigation, or they may
agree to one of two types of settlement payments. The settlement payments
will be discussed below after the trial outcome is analyzed. Even though the
parties have symmetric information, trial is possible because asymmetric
stakes between the insurer and the plaintiff are created by the existence of a
third party who is interested in the bargain-namely, the defendant. The
modem rule eliminates this asymmetry by forcing the insurer to internalize the
costs of trial and settlement (in the sense that the insurer must act as if it bears
the defendant's costs) that might be imposed on the defendant. But under the
laissez-faire rule;t + t, may be greater than ;rP + ;x1 for any feasible settlement outcome, implying that the gains to settlement are negative.
In terms of Figure 1, trial occurs when the threat point T is located in the
region denoted L. It is characterized by the following inequalities:

8. The nonconvexity of the bargaining set excludes the use of the Nash bargaining solution,
which would move ar, off to infinity when ti is sufficiently small.
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H(C) > 2L,

(1)

H(C) > L + D - C.

(2)

Recalling that the insurer is liable for trial cost L, one can see that trial occurs
when the insurer would be forced to pay C or something close to C in a
settlement, but because the damages have a high variance the insurer may do
well at trial.
Returning to Figure 1, if the threat point T is outside of the litigation region,
then settlement results in an outcome on either the slanted or vertical portion
of the settlement frontier. Graphically, the settlement outcome is located by
constructing a 45 degree line through the threat point and finding the intersection with the settlement frontier. The fact that this line has a slope of 1 is
equivalent to the assumption that the gains from settlement are shared equally.
When the settlement outcome is on the slanted portion of the settlement
frontier, I call the outcome a "strong" settlement; otherwise, I call it a
"weak" settlement. The adjectives are chosen from the insurer's and defendant's perspective. In the case of a strong settlement, the insurance contract is
effective in reducing X below/D, while in the case of a weak settlement X may
be above or below D. Figure 1 shows the values of the threat point that result
in strong settlements (labeled S) and weak settlements (labeled W).
To understand the impact of the limited coverage on settlement negotiations, consider the S region in Figure 2. The point X1 represents some pair
(-D,5) for ) < C. Under the modem rule, the threat point T 1 = (-D L,D - L) would result in X 1 as the settlement outcome. In contrast, under a
laissez-faire rule, the threat point is shifted to the right by an amount H(C) to
T', and the result is a bargaining outcome of X'. The shift in the threat point
occurs because the insurance company is exposed to less risk if the settlement
negotiation breaks down, and this makes it a more aggressive bargainer.
Next, to analyze a weak settlement outcome, consider a point X2 =
(-D,D), where/D > C. The modem-rule bargain moves from the threat point
T 2 = (-D - L,D - L) back to X2 . As in the case of strong settlement, the
laissez-faire bargain causes the threat point to shift to the right by H(C) to T2,
but it also causes the settlement frontier to shift from the 135 degree line to the
vertical line. The insurer is a more aggressive bargainer because of the shift in
the threat point, but this is counteracted by the effect of the policy limit, which
shifts the settlement frontier. The resulting bargaining outcome is at X2.
The conditions for a strong settlement are that the inequality in (1) is
reversed and
H(C) >- 2(

- C).

(3)

Expression (3), which represents the boundary between strong and weak
settlement regions, is a line segment with slope 1 that intersects the kink in the
settlement frontier at (-C,C). This boundary is obtained by construction,
since both the strong and weak settlement outcomes are obtained as the
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Figure 2. Strong and weak settlement outcomes.

intersection of the settlement frontier and a line with a slope of 1 passing
through T. The conditions for a weak settlement are that (2) and (3) be
reversed.
When the threat point is in the S region, the gain to settlement, as compared
to trial, is -(tp + ti), and the payment to the plaintiff is
X s = tp -

I(tp + t) = f) -

(4)

H(C),

where the S subscript on X indicates a strong settlement outcome. The gain to
settlement in the W region is (X w - C) - (ti + tp), and the payment to the
plaintiff is
Xw = tp + (Xw -

C- tp - i)=

- C - H(C).

(5)

The bargaining outcomes described above that attain under the two different legal regimes are collected in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The bargain under the modem rule always results in a
settlement payment of f) to the plaintiff. The laissez-faire bargain may result
in (i) trial, (ii) X s = 5 - 'H(C) :- D, or (iii) X w = 25 - C + H(C) ::5. 9
The payoffs to the three parties in the case of a strong settlement are
Zp = Xs,

.ri= -XS,

(6)

3rd = 0;

9. If F(D') = 1 for some D' < c, then C >- D' > H(C) = 0 and Xs =

.
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in the case of weak settlement, they are
Jrp = XW,

-7i= -C,

(7)

rd= -X w + C;

and in the case of trial, they are
rp =D6 - L,

n i = -f) - L + H(C),

r

a d=

-H(C).

(8)

Notice that although C < o in the case of strong settlement, the defendant is
fully insured. Similarly, if the defendant purchases insurance under the modem rule, C = 5 is just sufficient to fully insure the defendant. Thus, when I
speak of full insurance, it should not be interpreted as a policy limit so high
that any possible damage judgment is fully covered. 10
Delegation of bargaining power from the defendant to the insurer may be
effective in strengthening the bargaining power of the defendant, but it may
also lead to trial. If the defendant ex post confronts circumstances in which the
insurer prefers trial, the defendant would be willing (because it would be
profitable) to intervene in the settlement negotiations and offer an extra settlement contribution to avoid trial. I rule out such renegotiation of the insurance
contract because I believe the insurer's concern for its reputation as a tough
bargainer is sufficient to make the insurer's commitment to the ex ante contract terms credible. In other words, the insurer would forgo the short-term
profit that could be derived from concurring in the defendant's plan to avoid
trial in return for a side payment to the insurer (essentially the defendant
would allow the insurer to reduce C), choosing instead the higher long-term
profit gained from maintaining a credible policy that gives the insurer absolute
control over settlement. The insurer rebuffs the defendant because it wants to
maintain its reputation as a tough bargainer. 1 The credibility of the insurer's
commitment not to adjust authority over the bargaining decision ex post finds
empirical support in Crisci and similar cases that give rise to this discussion.
4. Optimal Coverage
Now that the analysis of the bargaining outcome is complete, it is possible to
examine the optimal choice of coverage C by a potential defendant. This
problem is divided into two parts. First, Proposition 2 specifies the set of
10. The settlement analysis is easily modified to account for a solvency constraint on the part
of the defendant. For example, if the defendant has wealth W and purchases coverage C at a
premium of P, then under the modem rule the settlement payment becomes ) - G(C), where
G(C) = f +w_p[D - C - W + P]dF(D). A strong settlement payment under the laissez-faire
rule results in a payment of B - [G(C) + H(C)]. Since H(C) > G(C), the strong settlement still
gives a lower expected settlement payment to the plaintiff than the modem rule. Furthermore, the
expected settlement payment in either case is smaller than it would have been if the defendant had
infinite wealth. Thus the solvency constraint, like policy limits, works against the plaintiff in the
settlement bargain.
11. An alternative explanation for the lack of ex post adjustment of insurance contracts
between the insurer and the insured is the likely existence of private information held by each
party concerning damages and the probability of victory at trial.
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choices of C that yield strong or weak settlements or litigation. And, second,
Proposition 3 locates an optimal value of coverage C* by determining optimal
behavior in each of the three regions.
The boundaries of the three regions are characterized by (1), (2), and (3).
Suppose that these three conditions hold with equality. It is helpful to use
them to define C, C, and 6 as the solutions to the following:

H(C)

=

2L,

H(C) = 6 + L - C,

(9)

H(6) = 26 - 2.
The following proposition partitions values of C into sets corresponding to the
three regions.
Proposition2. Case I. If H(!D - L) -- 2L, then C 5-- ( yields a weak
settlement and C -- 6 yields a strong settlement.
Case I. If H(D) - L) > 2L, then C -- C yields a weak settlement, 0 < C <
C yields litigation, and C -- C yields a strong settlement.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The origin of Cases I and II and the determination of the region a particular
choice of C yields are illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows boundary
conditions (1), (2), and (3). The right-hand side of each of these expressions is
a straight line plotted against C. Notice that these three lines intersect at15 L. The line labeled X1X2 is 2L [from (1)]; the line labeled Y 1Y 2 is 2(D - C)
[from (3)]; and the line labeled Z 1Z 2 is f - C + L [from (2)]. The left-hand
side of each of the expressions is the same convex function H(C). 12 The two
examples of H(C) shown in the figure-Hi(C) and H2 (C)-correspond to
Cases I and II in Proposition 2.
As stated in Proposition 2, certain parameter values lead to Case I, wherein
no choice of C ever results in litigation. In Figure 3, this case corresponds to
H,(C) which represents a situation in which trial costs L are high relative to
the expected cost of trial that the insurer can push off onto the defendant
[which is H,(C)]. Trial is never attractive to the insurer in Case I because the
"externality" in the decision to litigate-that is, payments by the defendant in
excess of C-is small. Referring back to (1), (2), and (3), the reader can see
that in Figure 3, the conditions for a weak settlement are satisfied when C -C,, and the conditions for a strong settlement are satisfied when C -- C1.
Similarly, for H,(C), Case II is in effect, and a weak settlement prevails for C
-- 0 2 , litigation prevails for C2 < C < C2, and a strong settlement prevails
for C2 -- C.
12. It is easy to see that H(0) = D, limc.,,H(C) = 0, H'(C) = F(C) - 1 < 0, and-/(C) =
f(C) > 0.
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Figure 3. Policy limits and settlement outcomes.

To understand why low values of C result in a weak settlement outcome,
consider the position of the bargaining frontier in Figure 1. When C gets
small, the vertical portion of the frontier shifts toward the vertical axis and the
W region grows at the expense of S and L. The insurer is a weak bargainer
with a low C because the settlement payment of the insurer is constrained by C
and the insurer is bargaining for the benefit of the defendant. When C gets
large, the vertical portion of the frontier moves to the left faster than the ti
component of the threat point [because ati/aC = H(C) < 1], eventually
moving the insurer into the S region. The explanation is that when C is
sufficiently high the part of expected trial cost that can be sloughed onto the
defendant, H(C), is small, so litigation is not attractive, and the insurer is an
aggressive bargainer because it bears the full cost of settlement.
The extreme choices of coverage have the appropriate effect on the settlement bargain. If C = 0, then reference to (5) and (7) reveals that the weak
settlement results in the defendant paying f to the plaintiff, which is the same
as if the defendant were uninsured. If C = c, then (4) and (6) show that the
insurer pays f5 to the plaintiff, and the insurer and defendant lose the bargaining advantage accruing from limited policy coverage.
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Given an understanding of what type of bargaining outcome is associated
with different levels of coverage, it is now possible to address the question of
the optimal choice of coverage. The problem for the potential defendant at
stage 1 is to choose a level of coverage that minimizes expected liability,
where the premium for coverage C is determined by the zero profit condition to be P = -ari(C). Hence the cost to be minimized is P - adr(C) =
-a(pi(C) + .rd(C)), where :ri(C) and rd(C) are given by (6), (7), and (8). The
solution is stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition3. If Case I prevails, so that H(6 - L) -- 2L, then the optimal
coverage is C* = C. If Case II prevails, so that H(D)- L) > 2L, then C* = C.
Proof.If H(D - L) :- 2L, then from Proposition 2 a litigation outcome is
not possible. In either settlement region, minimizing 3rp is equivalent to
minimizing -a( ri(C) + 3rd(C)). In the case of strong settlement, one can see
from (4) that OXs/IC > 0 so C is optimal in the strong settlement region.
From (5), OXwIeC = -F(C) < 0, so ( is also optimal in the weak settlement
region, thus C* = C. If H(D - L) > 2L, then the results above for the strong
and weak settlement regions still apply-that is, the cost-minimizing level
of coverage is at a comer-but the payoff to a choice of C in the litigation
region must also be considered. From (8), -a(r,(C) + 3rd(C)) = a(D + L),
which is independent of C. At C = C, -a(r,(C) + gd(Q) = a(D - L), thus
11
C* = C.
Proposition 3 could also have C* = C when H(!D - L) > 2L, because the
cost of settlement is X w = 1) - L, which-is the same as when C* = C. I focus
on C in the proposition because C is not robust to the introduction of a risk
aversion. C is optimal in the case of risk aversion because it minimizes
expected liability cost -a(;ri(C) + 3rd(C)), and it achieves full insurance since
.rd(C) = 0. In contrast, C does not achieve full insurance because X w = 5 L > 0.13

A second interesting observation about Proposition 3 is that the potential
defendant can always reduce expected liability given an accident below f5 by
When C* = C, ;rp = 1) - L, and when
the appropriate choice of coverage.
14
C* = , 3rp=CE(D - L ).
In Case II the delegation of bargaining authority is maximally effective
because a level of coverage can be chosen that will hold the plaintiff to its
secure profit level, f) - L, while still assuring settlement. In Case I, at the
optimal level of coverage the plaintiff does better than its security level. The
two cases are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.
The optimal coverage in Case II is displayed in Figure 4. In this figure, To
13. D - L > C because H' < 0 and H(!) - L) < H(C).

14. The function H(C) + 2C - 26 is strictly increasing and has one zero. If this function is
evaluated at f) - L, it is negative, and if it is evaluated at 6, it is zero; thus, 6 >/ 6- L. When
the function is evaluated at 15, it is positive; thus, 6 <13.
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Figure 4. Optimal coverage in Case II.

represents the threat point that would prevail in the case of unlimited coverage. The outcome would be a settlement payment of f) to the plaintiff. The
choice of coverage C shifts the threat point to the right to T, while introducing
a kink in the settlement frontier. C is chosen so that the gains from settlement
are reduced to zero. Thus, the plaintiff is held to the secure profit level X s =
D - L.

15

As shown in Figure 5, this outcome is not possible in Case I. As in Figure
4, T o represents the "original" threat point that would prevail if the coverage
were unlimited, and T 1 represents the threat point that prevails given optimal
coverage 6. The bargaining outcomes Xo and X1 correspond to the coverage
levels generating To and T 1. By reducing the coverage from infinity to C, the
insurance company is induced to bargain for a lower settlement payment
(Xo shifts to X 1) as its threat point is shifted to the right. But at C further
reductions in coverage increase the settlement payment, because not only
does the threat point shift to the right but the policy limit becomes an effective
constraint on the settlement payment by the insurer. For example, a reduction
in coverage that shifted the threat point to T2 would move the settlement to
X2 ; thus, it is not possible to reduce the settlement payment to 1) - L as in
Case II.
Researchers have puzzled over the prevalence of business insurance. If
firms should act as if they are risk neutral, why do they buy so much insurance? Mayers and Smith (1982) argue that an important purpose of business
insurance is to provide claims processing in the event of accidents. They cite
15. An interesting sidelight is that under the modem rule the magnitude of trial costs has no
impact on the equilibrium settlement outcome. In contrast, Case II shows that an exogeneous
increase in the trial costs to both parties works to the benefit of the insurer.
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Figure 5. Optimal coverage in Case I.

an interesting example of the purchase of insurance following the MGM
Grand Hotel fire. The owners of the hotel-held $30 million worth of insurance
before the fire, but purchased additional coverage raising the limit to $200
million after the fire. The new coverage applied retroactively to the losses
caused by the fire. Mayers and Smith contend that the purpose of the additional coverage was to transfer the burden of processing all of the claims to the
insurer, who was better suited to that task. Proposition 3 suggests a second
complementary explanation, namely, the increased coverage achieved the
optimal incentives for the insurer in the settlement negotiations. The proposition does not apply exactly, because the hotel fire produced many plaintiffs
rather than a single plaintiff and the model does not explain the adjustment of
coverage. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that if the hotel estimated something on the order of $250 million in damages at trial, then fixing their
coverage at $200 million would be an effective bargaining tactic.
5. Imperfect Information, Risk Aversion, and Incomplete Coverage
In the preceding model the defendant was able to choose an optimal level of
coverage while knowing as much about the distribution of damages as the
insurer and the plaintiff at the time of settlement negotiations. In this section I
relax that assumption and suppose that the defendant must commit to a coverage level before the occurrence of the accident, knowing that the plaintiff and
insurer will be better informed at the time of settlement negotiations should
such negotiations arise. I also assume that the defendant is risk averse.
My goal in this section is to show that a risk-averse potential liability
defendant should select a level of insurance coverage that is responsive to the
impact of coverage on the bargaining power of the insurer. In some circumstances the insured should be willing to accept less than full insurance and the

516

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V8 N3

possibility of inefficient litigation in order to make the insurer a more ag16
gressive bargainer.
The model is modified so that information about the distribution of
damages becomes available to the insurer and the plaintiff after the occurrence
of an accident. At the time the contract is signed and C is chosen, it is
common knowledge that 0 is the probability that damages are distributed
17
according to F, and 1 - 0 is the probability that they are distributed as F 2 . I
assume that F 2 is a mean-preserving increase in the riskiness (mpir) of the
distribution of damages relative to Ft. Roughly speaking, a mpir of distribution F1 results in a new distribution F2 that has the same mean/1, but has an
associated density that puts more mass in the tails (Rothschild and Stiglitz). I
also assume that F, is chosen so thatH 1 (D - L) > 2L. The significance of this
assumption is that both F 1 and F 2 give rise to Case II bargains, so that trial is a
possibility. 18 After the accident and before settlement negotiation, the insurer
and the plaintiff learn whether F 1 or F2 is the true distribution of damages.
The consequence of a mpir of the distribution of damages for the settlement
outcome is interesting and easy to analyze. Since expected damages are
constant (as are C and L), there is no change in the settlement outcome under
the modem rule. In contrast, the settlement outcome under the laissez-faire
rule is affected by a mpir. The following lemma shows that mpir of the
distribution of damages increases the expected cost to the defendant from
litigation, given a particular level of coverage.
Lemma 1. If F 2 is a mean-preserving increase of riskiness derived from F 1 ,
then H 2(C) - H 1(C).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, this occurs because the spread of the distribution puts more
mass in the right-hand tail where D > C; hence, the defendant is more likely
to be exposed to damage judgments in excess of C. Surprisingly, the defendant may benefit from the increased spread even though it imposes more
liability on the defendant in the event of trial. The reason is that the reduced
expected litigation liability placed on the insurer induces a favorable shift in
the insurer's threat point, allowing a smaller payment in the strong settlement
case.
The potential defendant's uncertainty about the distribution of damages
adds an interesting dimension to the problem because he or she may not know
whether a particular choice of C will result in settlement or trial. Recalling
Proposition 2, one can see that for a particular distribution, small values of C
16. If the potential defendant is risk-neutral, then there is still an interesting trade-off between
increased bargaining power and increased probability of litigation.
17. C may not depend on which cumulative distribution function is realized. I assume that this
information is not verifiable.
18. The assumption on F, assures that F2 results in a Case II settlement because of the result in
Lemma 1.
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Figure 6. Settlement outcomes under imperfect information.

result in weak settlement, high values of C result in strong settlement, and
intermediate values of C result in trial. Lemma 1 shows that the riskier
distribution leads to trial for a larger set of values of coverage. 19 Intuitively,
this is because the externality faced by the insurer in terms of expected
damages at trial borne by the defendant, H(C), is larger with a riskier
distribution.
Figure 6 shows the bargaining outcomes for different values of C. The first
letter in each pair is the type of outcome under F, and the second letter is the
type of outcome under F 2 . Recall the definitions in (9) that give the boundaries for different regions, and note that the subscripts refer to distributions F,
or F 2. For example, if C, < C < C2 , then a strong settlement is negotiated
under F, and trial occurs under F 2 .
Notice that in terms of Figure 6 the insured could choose C -- C2 and assure
that a strong settlement would always occur and thereby gain full insurance.
This choice would be optimal for a catatonically risk-averse individual if 0 <
1. On the other hand, if 0 = 1, then for any degree of risk aversion C* = C, is
optimal, because it provides full insurance and maximum bargaining power.
The purpose of the next proposition is to show that, for some values of 0 < 1
and insureds who are not so risk averse as to play a minimax strategy, a choice
of C is optimal.
In preparation for stating the potential defendant's maximization problem,
it is convenient to define ;rd(C;F,) and rri(C;F,) for n = 1 or 2 as, respectively, the payoffs to the defendant and the insured from policy limit C and
distribution F,,. From (6), (7), and (8), it follows that

;ri(C;Fn) =

-C,

C -<On,

-[D) + L - H(C)],
-[D
[
H(C)],

On < C < On,

-[2D -H(C),

C - < Cn,

On - C,

and
;r(C;F,,) =

0,

C - H(C)],

On

C <

On,

Cn :5C.

The maximization problem for the potential defendant with wealth W and
utility function U is
19. Trial occurs for values of C between e and C. Since H2(C) S HI(C), C2 5C1, and trials occur for a broader interval of coverage under F2 .

C1

and C2

"
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max (1 - a)U[W - P] + aOU[W - P + 3Td(C;FI)]

c>!o
+ a(1 - O)U[W - P + .7d(C;F2 )],
given
P

=

aO.ri(C;F1) + a(1

-

O);i(C;F2).

The following proposition partially characterizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition5. For any concave utility function there exists a 0' < 1 such
that for 0' < 0 < 1 the optimal policy limit is C1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 sheds some light on what happened to Crisci. Let the distribution of damages F, correspond to the normal "slip and fall" accident and F 2
correspond to the remote possibility of an accident causing the plaintiff to be
suspended above the ground by the planks of a wrecked stairway. If the
conditional probability of a type 2 accident, 0, is quite small, then Crisci
might optimally choose a policy limit of C1, knowing that if an accident
occurred, then with probability 1 - 0 her insurance company would reach a
"strong" settlement outcome with the plaintiff, but with probability 0 it
would choose to litigate. Such a contract would be ex ante optimal for Crisci,
even though ex post it would bitterly disappoint her. If the modem rule is
applied in this problem, then the bargaining advantage disappears and there is
equal to
always settlement and full insurance. The policy limit C would be 2set
0
5 and this would be the settlement payment for either F, or F2 .
6. Tie Welfare Implications of the Laissez-faire and Modern Rules
If the assumption that liability insurers lack market power 2 ' is reasonable,
then selection by the market of insurance contracts that gave unfettered discretion to insurers regarding settlement and trial decisions must have reflected
some efficiency advantage. The point of the preceding sections is that potential defendants did indeed benefit from this contractual arrangement because it
improved the bargaining position of the insurance companies vis-h-vis plaintiffs. Can the judicial intervention I have called the modem rule be socially
desirable given that it eliminates the bargaining advantage that accrues to

20. The results in this section are not limited to the case where F2 is a mpir ofF 1 . The trade-off
faced by the defendant between a choice of C that maximizes bargaining power, and one that
minimizes risk and the probability of litigation is generally present when the insurer has better
information at the time of negotiation. Furthermore, the modem rule always strips the defendant
of any bargaining advantage from limited coverage and thus leads to full insurance.
21. See Priest for a discussion of the market for liability insurance.
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potential defendants? The answer is yes, precisely because it eliminates this
advantage.
The bargaining advantage of the insurer and the defendant comes at the
expense of the plaintiffs, third parties interested in the insurance contract who
are unable to participate in the structuring of that contract because they are
strangers to the other parties at the time the contract terms are chosen.
Laissez-faire contracts maximize the payoff to the insurer and the defendant,
but they also introduce inefficiencies in the form of trial costs and unnecessary
risk-bearing by a risk-averse party (as described in Section 5). These inefficiencies are tolerated by the defendant, whose share of the surplus grows fast
enough to compensate for the decline in the total surplus caused by the
inefficiencies.
The imposition of the modem rule eliminates the bargaining advantage that
may accrue from the choice of policy limits, and at the same time eliminates
the problems of litigation and incomplete coverage. Thus the judicial intervention that forces insurers to consider the interests of their insureds in making settlement and trial decisions is socially desirable. The reader should note,
of course, that this argument does not apply to the case discussed in Section 3,
wherein the defendant at the time coverage is chosen is privy to the same
information as the insurer at the time of settlement negotiations; in such a
case, there is always settlement and full insurance.
A second welfare issue is raised by the bargaining power created by limited
coverage under the laissez-faire rule: one concerning investments by the potential defendant that reduce the probability of an accident or damages from
the accident. 2 2 Since the expected cost of an accident to the insured party does
not match the expected social cost, the investment incentives are distorted.
This problem holds for the model in Section 3 as well as the model in Section
5 because it depends on the bargaining power created by delegation of bargaining authority and not the difference in information held by the insured and
the insurer. To understand the distortion, suppose thatJ represents the amount
invested to reduce the probability of accident and K represents the amount
invested to reduce the expected damages given an accident. From a social
perspective, J and K should be chosen to minimize the expected damages
from accident plus the cost of precautionary investment, that is,
min a(I)D6(K) + J + K.
{J.K}

Instead of this minimization problem, the potential defendant bears an expected cost of aC in Case I or a(6 - L) in Case II. Quite simply, the success
of the policy limit as a bargaining tactic implies that the potential defendant
does not bear the true expected social cost. With regard to J, the investment in
reducing the probability of accident, the defendant will invest too little, because f - L < C < . In contrast, with regard to K, the investment in
reducing expected damages, the defendant overinvests in Case I and invests
22. The definitive work on this topic is Shavell.
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the correct amount in Case II. In Case II the defendant pockets the entire
reduction in expected damages in the form of reduced settlement payments.
7. Conclusion
In this article I have analyzed the conflict of interest between liability insurers
and tort defendants concerning the management of litigation. State courts
have responded to this conflict by forcing insurers to disregard the policy
limits when conducting settlement negotiations. Previous analysts laud this
intervention as a means of protecting policyholders from insurers. I argue
instead that the conflict engendered in the insurance contract is ex ante optimal
for the insured and insurer, and should be viewed as a tactic to achieve a
bargaining advantage over prospective plaintiffs. Nevertheless, judicial intervention to eliminate the conflict is warranted. The reason is that an insurance
contract that is optimal from the viewpoint of the insured and insurer imposes
social costs in terms of trial expenditures and inefficient risk bearing.
In the models above I have assumed that the modem rule is successful in
inducing insurers to disregard policy limits in settlement negotiations. In fact,
implementation has proven difficult and there has been substantial litigation
between insurers and insureds concerning "bad faith" by insurers in representing insureds. This is not surprising since the negligence standard embodied in the modem rule poses complex hypothetical questions for the jury and
23
makes monitoring of the insurer by insured difficult. An important future
research question is how enforcement problems under the modem rule interact
with settlement negotiations between the insurer and the plaintiff.
Another important issue neglected in this article is a general treatment of
the use of the liability insurance contract, or any contract for legal representation, to modify the incentives of an agent so as to make the agent a more
effective bargainer. Intuitively, it is likely that a principal could structure a
compensation contract for an agent that would make the agent less risk averse
or more patient than the principal, thus making the agent a more effective
bargainer than the principal could be. I have done preliminary work on this
topic as it relates to the liability insurance issues raised in this article. I find
24
that if the plaintiff is represented by an attorney on a contingent fee basis,
then the bargaining power of the plaintiff is unaffected. Roughly speaking,
this is true because the attorney's threat point and settlement frontier shift at
the same rate as the contingent fee sharing rate. Another direction of investigation is the impact of deductibles and coinsurance, as opposed to policy
limits, on the bargaining power of the defendant. I find these contractual
features have a neutral or negative impact on the bargaining power of the
23. In dicta, the court in Criscisuggested an alternative strict-liability rule that would make an
insurer who rejected a settlement offer within the policy limits liable for the entire judgment at
trial. Such a strict-liability rule would be much simpler to enforce, and the presentation of the
modern rule in this article is more consistent with such a rule.
24. Related work has been done by Danzon, who studied the issue of contingent fee contracts
and the incentive for attorneys to exert optimal effort. In addition, Miller raises important
questions about the impact of contingent fees on the bargaining process.
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defendant. Finally, it is important to investigate the significance of excess
insurance and reinsurance for the settlement negotiations. These contractual
features further complicate the settlement picture by creating potential conflicts between the primary insurer and the secondary insurer in addition to the
original conflict.
Appendix
Proofof Proposition2. In Case I, litigation is not possible. Since H' < 0,
Condition (1) is violated for C > f - L. For C </f - L, Condition (2) is
violated. To see this, notice that at the two points C = D - L, H(C) < 2L <f)
+ L - C, and at C = 0, H(C) = D <Df + L - C. Since H is convex andli +
L - C is linear, H(C) < D + L - C for any C <f)- L. Condition (3), which
gives the boundary between weak and strong settlement, has a single crossing
for positive coverage levels at 6. For C -- 6 the conditions for a strong
settlement are satisfied, and for C 5-- 6 the conditions for a weak settlement
are satisfied.
In Case II, litigation is possible. At C = ) - L, conditions (1) and (2) are
both satisfied. In fact, Condition (1) is satisfied for any C -- C. Since H
monotonically goes to zero as C goes to infinity, there must exist a unique C.
Furthermore, Condition (2) is satisfied for any C >- 6. There must exist a
unique C because H(C = 0) < f) + L, f) + L - C is linear, and H is convex.
For C -- C, weak settlement prevails, and for C - C strong settlement
prevails.
El
Proof of Lemma 1. From the definition of H(C),
H(C)

=

(D - C)dF(D) =/3

-

C[1 - F(C)] - I

D dF(D).

Integration by parts implies

H(C) = f-

C + I F(D)dD.

Finally, Rothschild and Stiglitz show that if F 2 is a mpir of F1 , then
f c F2(D)dD fc FI(D)dD, which implies that H 2(C) >_HI(C).
[
Proofof Proposition5. The strategy of the proof is to first find the optimal
choice of C within each of the five regions shown in Figure 6, then describe
the conditions that are sufficient to assure that the optimum is at C 1. In the WI
Wregion the optimal choice is C 2 , and in the WIL region the optimal choice is
C,, because expected utility is strictly increasing in C in these regions. In the
LIL region a maximum does not exist on this open set, but the supremum is at
C, because expected utility is again rising in C throughout this region. In the
SIL region, expected utility is concave in C. Finally, in the SIS region,
expected utility is declining in C and the optimum is at C 2 The choice of C1 in the LIL region is dominated by C 1 in the SIL region
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because the latter avoids the cost and uncertainty of trial. Furthermore, the
choice C 1 is also dominated by C1 in the SIL region because they result in the
same expected payments to the plaintiff, but the former choice imposes more
risk on the defendant since the weak settlement outcome requires a contribution from the defendant. To see that C, is preferred to C 2 , notice that EU(C1)
- EU(C2) > 0 when 0 = 1 because EU(C2) < EU(C1) and EU(C1) < EU(C1)
when 0 = 1. Since expected utility is continuous in 0, EU(C1) > EU(C2)
must hold in the neighborhood of 0 = 1. Next, to see that EU(C,) - EU(C2)
-- 0, note again that this difference is continuous in 0 and strict inequality
holds at 0 = 1. Finally, since expected utility is concave over the SIL region, I
require that dEU(C)IdC < 0 at C = C 1. The derivative is strictly negative at
C1 when 0 = 1, and the continuity of the derivative in 0 assures this condition
I]
holds for some 0' < 1.
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